Ericsson

8275 Trans Canada Route Saint Laurent, QC 4S 0B6 Canada daniel.migault@ericsson.com

Nominum

2000 Seaport Blvd Redwood City 94063 US ralf.weber@nominum.com

Sandelman Software Works

470 Dawson Avenue Ottawa, ON K1Z 5V7 Canada mcr+ietf@sandelman.ca

Globis Consulting BV

Weegschaalstraat 3 Eindhoven 5632CW NL v6ops@globis.net

Internet Homenet Internet-Draft Home network owners often have devices and services that they wish to access outside their home network - i.e., from the Internet using their names. To do so, these names need to be made publicly available in the DNS. This document describes how a Homenet Naming Authority (HNA) can instruct a DNS Outsourcing Infrastructure (DOI) to publish a Public Homenet Zone on its behalf.

Home network owners often have devices and services that they wish to access outside their home network - i.e., from the Internet using their names. To do so, these names needs to be made publicly available in the DNS. This document describes how a Homenet Naming Authority (HNA) can instruct a DNS Outsourcing Infrastructure (DOI) to publish a Public Homenet Zone on its behalf. The document introduces the Synchronization Channel and the Control Channel between the HNA and the Distribution Manager (DM) that belongs to the DOI. The Synchronization Channel (see ) is used to synchronize the Public Homenet Zone. The HNA is configured as a primary, while the DM is configured as a secondary. The Control Channel (see ) is used to set the Synchronization Channel. For example, to build the Public Homenet Zone, the HNA needs the authoritative servers (and associated IP addresses) of the servers of the DOI actually serving the zone. Similarly, the DOI needs to know the IP address of the primary (HNA) as well as potentially the hash of the KSK (DS RRset) to secure the DNSSEC delegation with the parent zone. The remaining of the document is as follows. provides an architectural view of the HNA, DM and DOI as well as its different communication channels (Control Channel, Synchronization Channel, DM Distribution Channel) respectively described in , and . and respectively details HNA security policies as well as DNSSEC compliance within the home network. discusses how renumbering should be handled. Finally, and respectively discuss privacy and security considerations when outsourcing the Public Homenet Zone. The appendices discuss several management (see ) provisioning (see ), configurations (see ) and deployment (see and ) aspects.

While this document does not create any normative mechanism to select the names to publish, this document anticipates that the home network administrator (a human being), will be presented with a list of current names and addresses. The administrator would mark which devices and services (by name), are to be published. The HNA would then collect the IPv6 address(es) associated with that device or service, and put the name into the Public Homenet Zone. The address of the device or service can be collected from a number of places: mDNS , DHCP , UPnP, PCP , or manual configuration. A device or service may have Global Unicast Addresses (GUA) (IPv6 or IPv4), a Unique Local IPv6 Address (ULA) , as well as IPv6-Link-Local addresses, IPv4-Link-Local Addresses (LLA), and private IPv4 addresses . Of these the link-local are never useful for the Public Zone, and should be omitted. The IPv6 ULA and the private IPv4 addresses may be useful to publish, if the home network environment features a VPN that would allow the home owner to reach the network. The IPv6 ULA addresses are safer to publish with a significantly lower probability of collision than RFC1918 addresses. In general, one expects the GUA to be the default address to be published. However, publishing the ULA and private IPv4 addresses may enable local communications within the home network. A direct advantage of enabling local communication is to enable communications even in case of Internet disruption. However, since communications are established with names which remains a global identifier, the communication can be protected by TLS the same way it is protected on the global Internet.  

An alternative existing solution is to have a single zone, where a host uses a RESTful HTTP service to register a single name into a common public zone. This is often called “Dynamic DNS” , and there are a number of commercial providers. While the IETF has defined Dynamic Update , in many – as far as the co-authors know in all cases – case commercial “Dynamic Update” solutions are implemented via a HTTPS RESTful API. These solutions were typically used by a host behind the CPE and since the CPE implements some NAT, the host can only be reached from the global Internet via its CPE IPv4 address. This is the most common scenario considered in this section, while some variant may also consider the client being hosted in the CPE. For a very few numbers of hosts, the use of such a system provides an alternative to the architecture described in this document. Dynamic DNS - even adapted to IPv6 and ignoring those associated to an IPv4 development - does suffer from some severe limitations: the CPE/HNA router is unaware of the process, and cannot respond to queries for these names and communications to these names require an Internet connectivity is order to perform the DNS resolution. Such dependence does not meet the requirement for internal communications to be resilient to ISP connectivity disruptions . the CPE/HNA router cannot control the process. Any host can do this regardless of whether or not the home network administrator wants the name published or not. There is therefore no possible audit trail. the credentials for the dynamic DNS server need to be securely transferred to all hosts that wish to use it. This is not a problem for a technical user to do with one or two hosts, but it does not scale to multiple hosts and becomes a problem for non-technical users. “all the good names are taken” – current services provide a small set of zones shared by all hosts across all home networks. More especially, there is no notion of a domain specific home network. As there are some commonalities provided by individual home networks, there are often conflicts. This makes the home user or application dependent on having to resolve different names in the event of outages or disruptions. Distinguishing similar names by delegation of zones was among the primary design goals of the DNS system. The RESTful services do not always support all RR types. The homenet user is dependent on the service provider supporting new types. By providing full DNS delegation, this document enables all RR types and also future extensions. Dynamic Updates solution are not interoperable and each provider has its own way to implement it. is the standard solution to update a DNS RRset, but most Dynamic Update providers use HTTPS RESTful API. There is no technical reason why a RESTful service could not provide solutions to many of these problems, but this document describes a DNS-based solution.

A number of deployment have been envisioned, this section aims at providing a brief description. The use cases are not limitations and this section is not normative.

A specific vendor with specific relations with a registrar or a registry may sell a CPE that is provisioned with provisioned domain name. Such domain name does not need to be necessary human readable. One possible way is that the vendor also provisions the HNA with a private and public keys as well as a certificate. Note that these keys are not expected to be used for DNSSEC signing. Instead these keys are solely used by the HNA to proceed to the authentication. Normally the keys should be necessary and sufficient to proceed to the authentication. The reason to combine the domain name and the key is that DOI are likely handle names better than keys and that domain names might be used as a login which enables the key to be regenerated. When the home network owner plugs the CPE at home, the relation between HNA and DM is expected to work out-of-the-box.

An CPE that is not preconfigured may also take advantage to the protocol defined in this document but some configuration steps will be needed. The owner of the home network buys a domain name to a registrar, and as such creates an account on that registrar Either the registrar is also providing the outsourcing infrastructure or the home network needs to create a specific account on the outsourcing infrastructure. * If the DOI is the registrar, it has by design a proof of ownership of the domain name by the homenet owner. In this case, it is expected the DOI provides the necessary parameters to the home network owner to configure the HNA. A good way to provide the parameters would be the home network be able to copy/paste a JSON object - see . What matters at that point is the DOI being able to generate authentication credentials for the HNA to authenticate itself to the DOI. This obviously requires the home network to provide the public key generated by the HNA in a CSR. If the DOI is not the registrar, then the proof of ownership needs to be established using protocols like ACME for example that will end in the generation of a certificate. ACME is used here to the purpose of automating the generation of the certificate, the CA may be a specific CA or the DOI. With that being done, the DOI has a roof of ownership and can proceed as above.

The key words “MUST”, “MUST NOT”, “REQUIRED”, “SHALL”, “SHALL NOT”, “SHOULD”, “SHOULD NOT”, “RECOMMENDED”, “NOT RECOMMENDED”, “MAY”, and “OPTIONAL” in this document are to be interpreted as described in BCP 14 when, and only when, they appear in all capitals, as shown here. (CPE) is a router providing connectivity to the home network. is the DNS zone for use within the boundaries of the home network: ‘home.arpa’ (see ). This zone is not considered public and is out of scope for this document. is the domain name that is associated with the home network. contains the names in the home network that are expected to be publicly resolvable on the Internet. A home network can have multiple Public Homenet Zones. Homenet Naming Authority(HNA): is a function responsible for managing the Public Homenet Zone. This includes populating the Public Homenet Zone, signing the zone for DNSSEC, as well as managing the distribution of that Homenet Zone to the DNS Outsourcing Infrastructure (DOI). is the infrastructure responsible for receiving the Public Homenet Zone and publishing it on the Internet. It is mainly composed of a Distribution Manager and Public Authoritative Servers. are the authoritative name servers for the Public Homenet Zone. Name resolution requests for the Homenet Domain are sent to these servers. For resiliency the Public Homenet Zone SHOULD be hosted on multiple servers. are authoritative name servers for the Homenet Zone within the Homenet network. is the (set of) server(s) to which the HNA synchronizes the Public Homenet Zone, and which then distributes the relevant information to the Public Authoritative Servers. The reverse zone file associated with the Public Homenet Zone. equivalent to Public Authoritative Servers specifically for reverse resolution. equivalent to Distribution Manager specifically for reverse resolution. a resolver that performs a DNSSEC resolution on the home network for the Public Homenet Zone. The resolution is performed requesting the Homenet Authoritative Servers. a resolver that performs a DNSSEC resolution on the Internet for the Public Homenet Zone. The resolution is performed requesting the Public Authoritative Servers.

This section provides an overview of the architecture for outsourcing the authoritative naming service from the HNA to the DOI. Note that defines necessary parameter to configure the HNA.

| Distribution Manager | | |+---------------------+| | | |+---------------------+| | || Public Homenet Zone ||Synchronization || Public Homenet Zone || | || (myhome.example) || Channel | | || (myhome.example) || | |+---------------------+|<-------------->|+---------------------+| | +-----------^-----------+ | | +-----------------------+ | . | | ^ Distribution | . | | | Channel | +-----------v-----------+ | | v | | Homenet Authoritative | | | +-----------------------+ | | Server(s) | | | | Public Authoritative | | |+---------------------+| | | | Server(s) | | ||Public Homenet Zone || | | |+---------------------+| | || (myhome.example) || | | || Public Homenet Zone || | |+---------------------+| | | || (myhome.example) || | || Homenet Zone || | | |+---------------------+| | || (home.arpa) || | | +-----------------------+ | |+---------------------+| | +----------^---|-------------+ +----------^---|--------+ | | | | | name resolution | | | v | | v +----------------------+ | +-----------------------+ | Homenet | | | Internet | | DNSSEC Resolver | | | DNSSEC Resolver | +----------------------+ | +-----------------------+ ]]>

illustrates the architecture where the HNA outsources the publication of the Public Homenet Zone to the DOI. The DOI will serve every DNSSEC request of the Public Homenet Zone coming from outside the home network. When the request is coming within the home network, the resolution is expected to be handled by the Homenet Resolver as detaille din further details below. The Public Homenet Zone is identified by the Registered Homenet Domain Name – myhome.example. The “.local” as well as “.home.arpa” are explicitly not considered as Public Homenet zones and represented as Homenet Zone in . The HNA SHOULD build the Public Homenet Zone in a single view populated with all resource records that are expected to be published on the Internet. The HNA also signs the Public Homenet Zone. The HNA handles all operations and keying material required for DNSSEC, so there is no provision made in this architecture for transferring private DNSSEC related keying material between the HNA and the DM. Once the Public Homenet Zone has been built, the HNA communicates and synchronizes it with the DOI using a primary/secondary setting as described in . The HNA acts as a hidden primary while the DM behaves as a secondary responsible to distribute the Public Homenet Zone to the multiple Public Authoritative Servers that DOI is responsible for. The DM has three communication channels: DM Control Channel () to configure the HNA and the DOI. This includes necessary parameters to configure the primary/secondary relation as well as some information provided by the DOI that needs to be included by the HNA in the Public Homenet Zone. DM Synchronization Channel () to synchronize the Public Homenet Zone on the HNA and on the DM with the appropriately configured primary/secondary. one or more Distribution Channels ( that distribute the Public Homenet Zone from the DM to the Public Authoritative Server serving the Public Homenet Zone on the Internet. There might be multiple DM’s, and multiple servers per DM. This document assumes a single DM server for simplicity, but there is no reason why each channel needs to be implemented on the same server or use the same code base. It is important to note that while the HNA is configured as an authoritative server, it is not expected to answer to DNS requests from the public Internet for the Public Homenet Zone. More specifically, the addresses associated with the HNA SHOULD NOT be mentioned in the NS records of the Public Homenet zone, unless additional security provisions necessary to protect the HNA from external attack have been taken. The DOI is also responsible for ensuring the DS record has been updated in the parent zone. Resolution is performed by the DNSSEC resolvers. When the resolution is performed outside the home network, the DNSSEC Resolver resolves the DS record on the Global DNS and the name associated to the Public Homenet Zone (myhome.example) on the Public Authoritative Servers. When the resolution is performed from within the home network, the Homenet DNSSEC Resolver MAY proceed similarly. On the other hand, to provide resilience to the Public Homenet Zone in case of WAN connectivity disruption, the Homenet DNSSEC Resolver SHOULD be able to perform the resolution on the Homenet Authoritative Servers. These servers are not expected to be mentioned in the Public Homenet Zone, nor to be accessible from the Internet. As such their information as well as the corresponding signed DS record MAY be provided by the HNA to the Homenet DNSSEC Resolvers, e.g., using HNCP or a by configuring a trust anchor . Such configuration is outside the scope of this document. Since the scope of the Homenet Authoritative Servers is limited to the home network, these servers are expected to serve the Homenet Zone as represented in . How the Homenet Authoritative Servers are provisioned is also out of scope of this specification. It could be implemented using primary and secondary servers, or via rsync. In some cases, the HNA and Homenet Authoritative Servers may be combined together which would result in a common instantiation of an authoritative server on the WAN and inner homenet interface. Note that REC-8 states this must not be the default configuration. Other mechanisms may also be used.

This section details the DM channels, that is the Control Channel, the Synchronization Channel and the Distribution Channel. The Control Channel and the Synchronization Channel are the interfaces used between the HNA and the DOI. The entity within the DOI responsible to handle these communications is the DM and communications between the HNA and the DM MUST be protected and mutually authenticated. While discusses in more depth the different security protocols that could be used to secure, it is RECOMMENDED to use TLS with mutually authentication based on certificates to secure the channel between the HNA and the DM. The information exchanged between the HNA and the DM uses DNS messages protected by DNS over TLS (DoT) . In the future, other specifications may consider protecting DNS messages with other transport layers, among others, DNS over DTLS , or DNS over HTTPs (DoH) or DNS over QUIC . The main issue is that the Dynamic DNS update would also update the parent zone’s (NS, DS and associated A or AAAA records) while the goal is to update the DM configuration files. The visible NS records SHOULD remain pointing at the cloud provider’s server IP address – which in many cases will be an anycast addresses. Revealing the address of the HNA in the DNS is not desirable. Refer to for more details. This specification assumes: the DM serves both the Control Channel and Synchronization Channel on a single IP address, single port and using a single transport protocol. By default, the HNA uses a single IP address for both the Control and Synchronization channel. However, the HNA MAY use distinct IP addresses for the Control Channel and the Synchronization Channel - see and for more details. The Distribution Channel is internal to the DOI and as such is not the primary concern of this specification.

The DM Control Channel is used by the HNA and the DOI to exchange information related to the configuration of the delegation which includes information to build the Public Homenet Zone (), information to build the DNSSEC chain of trust () and information to set the Synchronization Channel (). While information is carried from the DOI to the HNA and from the HNA to the DOI, the HNA is always initiating the exchange in both directions. As such the HNA has a prior knowledge of the DM identity (X509 certificate), the IP address and port number to use and protocol to set secure session. The DM acquires knowledge of the identity of the HNA (X509 certificate) as well as the Registered Homenet Domain. For more detail to see how this can be achieved, please see .

The HNA builds the Public Homenet Zone based on information retrieved from the DM. The information includes at least names and IP addresses of the Public Authoritative Name Servers. In term of RRset information this includes: the MNAME of the SOA, the NS and associated A and AAA RRsets of the name servers. The DM MAY also provide operational parameters such as other fields of SOA (SERIAL, RNAME, REFRESH, RETRY, EXPIRE and MINIMUM). As the information is necessary for the HNA to proceed and the information is associated to the DM, this information exchange is mandatory.

The HNA SHOULD provide the hash of the KSK (DS RRset), so the DOI provides this value to the parent zone. A common deployment use case is that the DOI is the registrar of the Registered Homenet Domain and as such, its relationship with the registry of the parent zone enables it to update the parent zone. When such relation exists, the HNA should be able to request the DOI to update the DS RRset in the parent zone. A direct update is especially necessary to initialize the chain of trust. Though the HNA may also later directly update the values of the DS via the Control Channel, it is RECOMMENDED to use other mechanisms such as CDS and CDNSKEY for transparent updates during key roll overs. As some deployments may not provide a DOI that will be able to update the DS in the parent zone, this information exchange is OPTIONAL. By accepting the DS RR, the DM commits in taking care of advertising the DS to the parent zone. Upon refusal, the DM clearly indicates it does not have the capacity to proceed to the update.

The HNA works as a primary authoritative DNS server, while the DM works like a secondary. As a result, the HNA must provide the IP address the DM is using to reach the HNA. The synchronization Channel will be set between that IP address and the IP address of the DM. By default, the IP address used by the HNA in the Control Channel is considered by the DM and the specification of the IP by the HNA is only OPTIONAL. The transport channel (including port number) is the same as the one used between the HNA and the DM for the Control Channel.

The purpose of the previous sections were to exchange information in order to set a delegation. The HNA MUST also be able to delete a delegation with a specific DM. Upon an instruction of deleting the delegation, the DM MUST stop serving the Public Homenet Zone. The decision to delete an inactive HNA by the DM is part of the commercial agreement between DOI and HNA.

There are multiple ways this information could be exchanged between the HNA and the DM. This specification defines a mechanism that re-use the DNS exchanges format, while the exchange in itself is not a DNS exchange involved in any any DNS operations such as DNS resolution. Note that while information is provided using DNS exchanges, the exchanged information is not expected to be set in any zone file, instead this information is used as commands between the HNA and the DM. The Control Channel is not expected to be a long-term session. After a predefined timer - similar to those used for TCP - the Control Channel is expected to be terminated - by closing the transport channel. The Control Channel MAY be re-opened at any time later. The provisioning process SHOULD provide a method of securing the Control Channel, so that the content of messages can be authenticated. This authentication MAY be based on certificates for both the DM and each HNA. The DM may also create the initial configuration for the delegation zone in the parent zone during the provisioning process.

The information provided by the DM to the HNA is retrieved by the HNA with an AXFR exchange . AXFR enables the response to contain any type of RRsets. The response might be extended in the future if additional information will be needed. Alternatively, the information provided by the HNA to the DM is pushed by the HNA via a DNS update exchange . To retrieve the necessary information to build the Public Homenet Zone, the HNA MUST send a DNS request of type AXFR associated to the Registered Homenet Domain. The DM MUST respond with a zone template. The zone template MUST contain a RRset of type SOA, one or multiple RRset of type NS and zero or more RRset of type A or AAAA. The SOA RR indicates to the HNA the value of the MNAME of the Public Homenet Zone. The NAME of the SOA RR MUST be the Registered Homenet Domain. The MNAME value of the SOA RDATA is the value provided by the DOI to the HNA. Other RDATA values (RNAME, REFRESH, RETRY, EXPIRE and MINIMUM) are provided by the DOI as suggestions. The NS RRsets carry the Public Authoritative Servers of the DOI. Their associated NAME MUST be the Registered Homenet Domain. The TTL and RDATA are those expected to be published on the Public Homenet Zone. The RRsets of Type A and AAAA MUST have their NAME matching the NSDNAME of one of the NS RRsets. Upon receiving the response, the HNA MUST validate format and properties of the SOA, NS and A or AAAA RRsets. If an error occurs, the HNA MUST stop proceeding and MUST log an error. Otherwise, the HNA builds the Public Homenet Zone by setting the MNAME value of the SOA as indicated by the SOA provided by the AXFR response. The HNA SHOULD set the value of NAME, REFRESH, RETRY, EXPIRE and MINIMUM of the SOA to those provided by the AXFR response. The HNA MUST insert the NS and corresponding A or AAAA RRset in its Public Homenet Zone. The HNA MUST ignore other RRsets. If an error message is returned by the DM, the HNA MUST proceed as a regular DNS resolution. Error messages SHOULD be logged for further analysis. If the resolution does not succeed, the outsourcing operation is aborted and the HNA MUST close the Control Channel.

To provide the DS RRset to initialize the DNSSEC chain of trust the HNA MAY send a DNS update message. The DNS update message is composed of a Header section, a Zone section, a Pre-requisite section, and Update section and an additional section. The Zone section MUST set the ZNAME to the parent zone of the Registered Homenet Domain - that is where the DS records should be inserted. As described , ZTYPE is set to SOA and ZCLASS is set to the zone’s class. The Pre-requisite section MUST be empty. The Update section is a DS RRset with its NAME set to the Registered Homenet Domain and the associated RDATA corresponds to the value of the DS. The Additional Data section MUST be empty. Though the pre-requisite section MAY be ignored by the DM, this value is fixed to remain coherent with a standard DNS update. Upon receiving the DNS update request, the DM reads the DS RRset in the Update section. The DM checks ZNAME corresponds to the parent zone. The DM SHOULD ignore non-empty the Pre-requisite and Additional Data section. The DM MAY update the TTL value before updating the DS RRset in the parent zone. Upon a successful update, the DM should return a NOERROR response as a commitment to update the parent zone with the provided DS. An error indicates the MD does not update the DS, and other method should be used by the HNA. The regular DNS error message SHOULD be returned to the HNA when an error occurs. In particular a FORMERR is returned when a format error is found, this includes when unexpected RRSets are added or when RRsets are missing. A SERVFAIL error is returned when a internal error is encountered. A NOTZONE error is returned when update and Zone sections are not coherent, a NOTAUTH error is returned when the DM is not authoritative for the Zone section. A REFUSED error is returned when the DM refuses to proceed to the configuration and the requested action.

The default IP address used by the HNA for the Synchronization Channel is the IP address of the Control Channel. To provide a different IP address, the HNA MAY send a DNS UPDATE message. Similarly to the , the HNA MAY specify the IP address using a DNS update message. The Zone section sets its ZNAME to the parent zone of the Registered Homenet Domain, ZTYPE is set to SOA and ZCLASS is set to the zone’s type. Pre-requisite is empty. The Update section is a RRset of type NS. The Additional Data section contains the RRsets of type A or AAAA that designates the IP addresses associated to the primary (or the HNA). The reason to provide these IP addresses is to keep them unpublished and prevent them to be resolved. Upon receiving the DNS update request, the DM reads the IP addresses and checks the ZNAME corresponds to the parent zone. The DM SHOULD ignore a non-empty Pre-requisite section. The DM configures the secondary with the IP addresses and returns a NOERROR response to indicate it is committed to serve as a secondary. Similarly to , DNS errors are used and an error indicates the DM is not configured as a secondary.

To instruct to delete the delegation the HNA sends a DNS UPDATE Delete message. The Zone section sets its ZNAME to the Registered Homenet Domain, the ZTYPE to SOA and the ZCLASS to zone’s type. The Pre-requisite section is empty. The Update section is a RRset of type NS with the NAME set to the Registered Domain Name. As indicated by Section 2.5.2 the delete instruction is set by setting the TTL to 0, the Class to ANY, the RDLENGTH to 0 and the RDATA MUST be empty. The Additional Data section is empty. Upon receiving the DNS update request, the DM checks the request and removes the delegation. The DM returns a NOERROR response to indicate the delegation has been deleted. Similarly to , DNS errors are used and an error indicates the delegation has not been deleted.

The control channel between the HNA and the DM MUST be secured at both the HNA and the DM. Secure protocols (like TLS ) SHOULD be used to secure the transactions between the DM and the HNA. The advantage of TLS is that this technology is widely deployed, and most of the devices already embed TLS libraries, possibly also taking advantage of hardware acceleration. Further, TLS provides authentication facilities and can use certificates to mutually authenticate the DM and HNA at the application layer, including available API. On the other hand, using TLS requires implementing DNS exchanges over TLS, as well as a new service port. The HNA SHOULD authenticate inbound connections from the DM using standard mechanisms, such as a public certificate with baked-in root certificates on the HNA, or via DANE . The HNA is expected to be provisioned with a connection to the DM by the manufacturer, or during some user-initiated onboarding process, see . The DM SHOULD authenticate the HNA and check that inbound messages are from the appropriate client. The HNA certificate needs to provide sufficient trust to the DM that the HNA is legitimate. When certificates are used, it is left to the DM to define what information carried by the certificate is acceptable as well as which CA can issue the certificate. For example, some deployments may use domain validation certificates with the Registered Homenet Domain as a SAN of type FQDN. Other deployments may use specifically formed certificates with additional information such as a user account as a SAN of type URN, signed by a specific CA may be used. IPsec and IKEv2 were considered. They would need to operate in transport mode, and the authenticated end points would need to be visible to the applications, and this is not commonly available at the time of this writing. A pure DNS solution using TSIG and/or SIG(0) to authenticate message was also considered. envisions one mechanism would involve the end user, with a browser, signing up to a service provider, with a resulting OAUTH2 token to be provided to the HNA. A way to translate this OAUTH2 token from HTTPS web space to DNS SIG(0) space seems overly problematic, and so the enrollment protocol using web APIs was determined to be easier to implement at scale. Note also that authentication of message exchanges between the HNA and the DM SHOULD NOT use the external IP address of the HNA to index the appropriate keys. As detailed in , the IP addresses of the DM and the hidden primary are subject to change, for example while the network is being renumbered. This means that the necessary keys to authenticate transaction SHOULD NOT be indexed using the IP address, and SHOULD be resilient to IP address changes.

The Hidden Primary Server on the HNA differs from a regular authoritative server for the home network due to: the Hidden Primary Server will almost certainly listen on the WAN Interface, whereas a regular Homenet Authoritative Servers would listen on the internal home network interface. the purpose of the Hidden Primary Server is to synchronize with the DM, not to serve any zones to end users, or the public Internet. This results in a limited number of possible exchanges (AXFR/IXFR) with a small number of IP addresses and an implementation SHOULD enable filtering policies as described in .

The DM Synchronization Channel is used for communication between the HNA and the DM for synchronizing the Public Homenet Zone. Note that the Control Channel and the Synchronization Channel are by construction different channels even though there they may use the same IP address. Suppose the HNA and the DM are using a single IP address and let designate by XX, YYYY and ZZZZ the various ports involved in the communications. In fact the Control Channel is set between the HNA working as a client using port number YYYY (a high range port) toward a service provided by the DM at port number XX (well-known port such as 853 for DoT). On the other hand, the Synchronization Channel is set between the DM working as a client using port ZZZZ ( a high range port) toward a service provided by the HNA at port XX. As a result, even though the same pair of IP addresses may be involved the Control Channel and the Synchronization Channel are always distinct channels. Uploading and dynamically updating the zone file on the DM can be seen as zone provisioning between the HNA (Hidden Primary) and the DM (Secondary Server). This can be handled via AXFR + DNS UPDATE. The use of a primary / secondary mechanism is RECOMMENDED instead of the use of DNS UPDATE . The primary / secondary mechanism is RECOMMENDED as it scales better and avoids DoS attacks. Note that even when UPDATE messages are used, these messages are using a distinct channel as those used to set the configuration. Note that there is no standard way to distribute a DNS primary between multiple devices. As a result, if multiple devices are candidate for hosting the Hidden Primary, some specific mechanisms should be designed so the home network only selects a single HNA for the Hidden Primary. Selection mechanisms based on HNCP are good candidates. The HNA acts as a Hidden Primary Server, which is a regular authoritative DNS Server listening on the WAN interface. The DM is configured as a secondary for the Registered Homenet Domain Name. This secondary configuration has been previously agreed between the end user and the provider of the DOI as part of either the provisioning or due to receipt of DNS UPDATE messages on the DM Control Channel. The Homenet Reverse Zone MAY also be updated either with DNS UPDATE or using a primary / secondary synchronization.

The Synchronization Channel uses standard DNS requests. First the HNA (primary) notifies the DM (secondary) that the zone must be updated and leaves the DM (secondary) to proceed with the update when possible/convenient. More specifically, the HNA sends a NOTIFY message, which is a small packet that is less likely to load the secondary. Then, the DM sends AXFR or IXFR request. This request consists in a small packet sent over TCP (Section 4.2 ), which also mitigates reflection attacks using a forged NOTIFY. The AXFR request from the DM to the HNA SHOULD be secured and the use of TLS is RECOMMENDED . While does not consider the protection by TLS of NOTIFY and SOA requests, these MAY still be protected by TLS to provide additional privacy. When using TLS, the HNA MAY authenticate inbound connections from the DM using standard mechanisms, such as a public certificate with baked-in root certificates on the HNA, or via DANE . In addition, to guarantee the DM remains the same across multiple TLS session, the HNA and DM MAY implement . The HNA SHOULD apply an ACL on inbound AXFR requests to ensure they only arrive from the DM Synchronization Channel. In this case, the HNA SHOULD regularly check (via a DNS resolution) that the address of the DM in the filter is still valid.

The DM Distribution Channel is used for communication between the DM and the Public Authoritative Servers. The architecture and communication used for the DM Distribution Channels are outside the scope of this document, and there are many existing solutions available, e.g., rsynch, DNS AXFR, REST, DB copy.

The HNA as hidden primary processes only a limited message exchanges. This should be enforced using security policies - to allow only a subset of DNS requests to be received by HNA. The HNA, as Hidden Primary SHOULD drop any DNS queries from the home network – as opposed to return DNS errors. This could be implemented via port binding and/or firewall rules. The precise mechanism deployed is out of scope of this document. The HNA SHOULD drop any packets arriving on the WAN interface that are not issued from the DM – as opposed to server as an Homenet Authoritative Server exposed on the Internet. Depending how the communications between the HNA and the DM are secured, only packets associated to that protocol SHOULD be allowed. The HNA SHOULD NOT send DNS messages other than DNS NOTIFY query, SOA response, IXFR response or AXFR responses. The HNA SHOULD reject any incoming messages other than DNS NOTIFY response, SOA   query, IXFR query or AXFR query. 

Homenet Reverse Zone works similarly to the Public Homenet Zone. The main difference is that ISP that provides the IP connectivity is likely also owning the corresponding reverse zone and act as a default DOI for it. If so, the configuration and the setting of the Synchronization Channel and Control Channel can largely be automated. The Public Homenet Zone is associated to a Registered Homenet Domain and the ownership of that domain requires a specific registration from the end user as well as the HNA being provisioned with some authentication credentials. Such steps are mandatory unless the DOI has some other means to authenticate the HNA. Such situation may occur, for example, when the ISP provides the Homenet Domain as well as the DOI. In this case, the HNA may be authenticated by the physical link layer, in which case the authentication of the HNA may be performed without additional provisioning of the HNA. While this may not be so common for the Public Homenet Zone, this situation is expected to be quite common for the Reverse Homenet Zone as the ISP owns the IP address or IP prefix. More specifically, a common case is that the upstream ISP provides the IPv6 prefix to the Homenet with a IA_PD option and manages the DOI of the associated reverse zone. This leaves place for setting up automatically the relation between HNA and the DOI as described in . In the case of the reverse zone, the DOI authenticates the source of the updates by IPv6 Access Control Lists. In the case of the reverse zone, the ISP knows exactly what addresses have been delegated. The HNA SHOULD therefore always originate Synchronization Channel updates from an IP address within the zone that is being updated. For example, if the ISP has assigned 2001:db8:f00d::/64 to the WAN interface (by DHCPv6, or PPP/RA), then the HNA should originate Synchronization Channel updates from, for example, 2001:db8:f00d::2. An ISP that has delegated 2001:db8:aeae::/56 to the HNA via DHCPv6-PD, then HNA should originate Synchronization Channel updates an IP within that subnet, such as 2001:db8:aeae:1::2. With this relation automatically configured, the synchronization between the Home network and the DOI happens similarly as for the Public Homenet Zone described earlier in this document. Note that for home networks connected to by multiple ISPs, each ISP provides only the DOI of the reverse zones associated to the delegated prefix. It is also likely that the DNS exchanges will need to be performed on dedicated interfaces as to be accepted by the ISP. More specifically, the reverse zone associated to prefix 1 will not be possible to be performs by the HNA using an IP address that belongs to prefix 2. Such constraints does not raise major concerns either for hot standby or load sharing configuration. With IPv6, the reverse domain space for IP addresses associated to a subnet such as ::/64 is so large that reverse zone may be confronted with scalability issues. How the reverse zone is generated is out of scope of this document. provides guidance on how to address scalability issues.

in Section 3.7.3 recommends DNSSEC to be deployed on both the authoritative server and the resolver. The resolver side is out of scope of this document, and only the authoritative part of the server is considered. It is RECOMMENDED the HNA signs the Public Homenet Zone. Secure delegation is achieved only if the DS RRset is properly set in the parent zone. Secure delegation can be performed by the HNA or the DOIs and the choice highly depends on which entity is authorized to perform such updates. Typically, the DS RRset can be updated manually in the parent zone with nsupdate for example. This requires the HNA or the DOI to be authenticated by the DNS server hosting the parent of the Public Homenet Zone. Such a trust channel between the HNA and the parent DNS server may be hard to maintain with HNAs, and thus may be easier to establish with the DOI. In fact, the Public Authoritative Server(s) may use Automating DNSSEC Delegation Trust Maintenance .

During a renumbering of the network, the HNA IP address is changed and the Public Homenet Zone is updated potentially by the HNA. Then, the HNA advertises the DM via a NOTIFY, that the Public Homenet Zone has been updated and that the IP address of the primary has been updated. This corresponds to the standard DNS procedure performed on the Synchronization Channel and no specific actions are expected for the HNA (See ). The remaining of the section provides recommendations regarding the provisioning of the Public Homenet Zone - especially the IP addresses. Renumbering has been extensively described in and analyzed in and the reader is expected to be familiar with them before reading this section. In the make-before-break renumbering scenario, the new prefix is advertised, the network is configured to prepare the transition to the new prefix. During a period of time, the two prefixes old and new coexist, before the old prefix is completely removed. In the break-before-make renumbering scenario, the new prefix is advertised making the old prefix obsolete. In a renumbering scenario, the HNA or Hidden Primary is informed it is being renumbered. In most cases, this occurs because the whole home network is being renumbered. As a result, the Public Homenet Zone will also be updated. Although the new and old IP addresses may be stored in the Public Homenet Zone, it is RECOMMENDED that only the newly reachable IP addresses be published. Regarding the Homenet Reverse Zone, the new Homenet Reverse Zone has to be populated as soon as possible, and the old Homenet Reverse Zone will be deleted by the owner of the zone (and the owner of the old prefix which is usually the ISP) once the prefix is no longer assigned to the HNA. The ISP SHOULD ensure that the DNS cache has expired before re-assigning the prefix to a new home network. This may be enforced by controlling the TTL values. To avoid reachability disruption, IP connectivity information provided by the DNS SHOULD be coherent with the IP in use. In our case, this means the old IP address SHOULD NOT be provided via the DNS when it is not reachable anymore. Let for example TTL be the TTL associated with a RRset of the Public Homenet Zone, it may be cached for TTL seconds. Let T_NEW be the time the new IP address replaces the old IP address in the Homenet Zone, and T_OLD_UNREACHABLE the time the old IP is not reachable anymore. In the case of the make-before-break, seamless reachability is provided as long as T_OLD_UNREACHABLE - T_NEW > 2 * TTL. If this is not satisfied, then devices associated with the old IP address in the home network may become unreachable for 2 * TTL - (T_OLD_UNREACHABLE - T_NEW). In the case of a break-before-make, T_OLD_UNREACHABLE = T_NEW, and the device may become unreachable up to 2 * TTL. Of course if T_NEW >= T_OLD_UNREACHABLE, the disruption is increased.

Outsourcing the DNS Authoritative service from the HNA to a third party raises a few privacy related concerns. The Public Homenet Zone lists the names of services hosted in the home network. Combined with blocking of AXFR queries, the use of NSEC3 (vs NSEC ) prevents an attacker from being able to walk the zone, to discover all the names. However, recent work or have shown that the protection provided by NSEC3 against dictionary attacks should be considered cautiously and provides guidelines to configure NSEC3 properly. In addition, the attacker may be able to walk the reverse DNS zone, or use other reconnaissance techniques to learn this information as described in . The zone is also exposed during the synchronization between the primary and the secondary. only specifies the use of TLS for XFR transfers, which leak the existence of the zone and has been clearly specified as out of scope of the threat model of . Additional privacy MAY be provided by protecting all exchanges of the Synchronization Channel as well as the Control Channel. In general a home network owner is expected to publish only names for which there is some need to be able to reference externally. Publication of the name does not imply that the service is necessarily reachable from any or all parts of the Internet. mandates that the outgoing-only policy be available, and in many cases it is configured by default. A well designed User Interface would combine a policy for making a service public by a name with a policy on who may access it. In many cases, and for privacy reasons, the home network owner wished publish names only for services that they will be able to access. The access control may consist of an IP source address range, or access may be restricted via some VPN functionality. The main advantages of publishing the name are that service may be access by the same name both within the home and outside the home and that the DNS resolution can be handled similarly within the home and outside the home. This considerably eases the ability to use VPNs where the VPN can be chosen according to the IP address of the service. Typically, a user may configure its device to reach its homenet devices via a VPN while the remaining of the traffic is accessed directly. In such cases, the routing policy is likely to be defined by the destination IP address. Enterprise networks have generally adopted another strategy designated as split-DNS. While such strategy might appear as providing more privacy at first sight, its implementation remains challenging and the privacy advantages needs to be considered carefully. In split-DNS, names are designated with internal names that can only be resolved within the corporate network. When such strategy is applied to homenet, VPNs needs to be both configured with a naming resolution policies and routing policies. Such approach might be reasonable with a single VPN, but maintaining a coherent DNS space and IP space among various VPNs comes with serious complexities. Firstly, if multiple homenets are using the same domain name -like home.arpa - it becomes difficult to determine on which network the resolution should be performed. As a result, homenets should at least be differentiated by a domain name. Secondly, the use of split-DNS requires each VPN being associated to a resolver and specific resolutions being performed by the dedicated resolver. Such policies can easily raises some conflicts (with significant privacy issues) while remaining hard to be implemented. In addition to the Public Homenet Zone, pervasive DNS monitoring can also monitor the traffic associated with the Public Homenet Zone. This traffic may provide an indication of the services an end user accesses, plus how and when they use these services. Although, caching may obfuscate this information inside the home network, it is likely that outside your home network this information will not be cached.

This document exposes a mechanism that prevents the HNA from being exposed to the Internet and served DNS request from the Internet. These requests are instead served by the DOI. While this limits the level of exposure of the HNA, the HNA remains exposed to the Internet with communications with the DOI. This section analyses the attack surface associated to these communications, the data published by the DOI, as well as operational considerations.

The channels between HNA and DM are mutually authenticated and encrypted with TLS and its associated security considerations apply. To ensure the multiple TLS session are continuously authenticating the same entity, TLS may take advantage of second factor authentication as described in . At the time of writing TLS 1.2 or TLS 1.3 can be used and TLS 1.3 (or newer) SHOULD be supported. It is RECOMMENDED that all DNS exchanges between the HNA and the DM be protected by TLS to provide integrity protection as well as confidentiality. As noted in , some level of privacy may be relaxed, by not protecting the existence of the zone. This MAY involved a mix of exchanges protected by TLS and exchanges not protected by TLS. This MAY be handled by a off-line agreement between the DM and HNA as well as with the use of RCODES defined in Section 7.8 of . The DNS protocol is subject to reflection attacks, however, these attacks are largely applicable when DNS is carried over UDP. The interfaces between the HNA and DM are using TLS over TCP, which prevents such reflection attacks. Note that Public Authoritative servers hosted by the DOI are subject to such attacks, but that is out of scope of our document. Note that in the case of the Reverse Homenet Zone, the data is less subject to attacks than in the Public Homenet Zone. In addition, the DM and RDM may be provided by the ISP - as described in , in which case DM and RDM might be less exposed to attacks - as communications within a network.

This document describes how an end user can make their services and devices from his home network reachable on the Internet by using names rather than IP addresses. This exposes the home network to attackers, since names are expected to include less entropy than IP addresses. In fact, with IP addresses, the Interface Identifier is 64 bits long leading to up to 2^64 possibilities for a given subnetwork. This is not to mention that the subnet prefix is also of 64 bits long, thus providing up to 2^64 possibilities. On the other hand, names used either for the home network domain or for the devices present less entropy (livebox, router, printer, nicolas, jennifer, …) and thus potentially exposes the devices to dictionary attacks.

IP addresses may be used to locate a device, a host or a service. However, home networks are not expected to be assigned a time invariant prefix by ISPs. In addition IPv6 enables temporary addresses that makes them even more volatile . As a result, observing IP addresses only provides some ephemeral information about who is accessing the service. On the other hand, names are not expected to be as volatile as IP addresses. As a result, logging names over time may be more valuable than logging IP addresses, especially to profile an end user’s characteristics. PTR provides a way to bind an IP address to a name. In that sense, responding to PTR DNS queries may affect the end user’s privacy. For that reason PTR DNS queries and MAY instead be configured to return with NXDOMAIN.

The HNA is expected to sign the DNSSEC zone and as such hold the private KSK/ZSK. To provide resilience against CPE breaks, it is RECOMMENDED to backup these keys to avoid an emergency key roll over when the CPE breaks. The HNA enables to handle network disruption as it contains the Public Homenet Zone, which is provisioned to the Homenet Authoritative Servers. However, DNSSEC validation requires to validate the chain of trust with the DS RRset that is stored into the parent zone of the Registered Homenet Domain. As currently defined, the handling of the DS RRset is left to the Homenet DNSSEC resolver which retrieves from the parent zone via a DNS exchange and cache the RRset according to the DNS rules, that is respecting the TTL and RRSIG expiration time. Such constraints do put some limitations to the type of disruption the proposed architecture can handle. In particular, the disruption is expected to start after the DS RRset has been resolved and end before the DS RRset is removed from the cache. One possible way to address such concern is to describe mechanisms to provision the DS RRset to the Homenet DNSSEC resolver for example, via HNCP or by configuring a specific trust anchors . Such work is out of the scope of this document.

This document has no actions for IANA.

The authors wish to thank Philippe Lemordant for its contributions on the early versions of the draft; Ole Troan for pointing out issues with the IPv6 routed home concept and placing the scope of this document in a wider picture; Mark Townsley for encouragement and injecting a healthy debate on the merits of the idea; Ulrik de Bie for providing alternative solutions; Paul Mockapetris, Christian Jacquenet, Francis Dupont and Ludovic Eschard for their remarks on HNA and low power devices; Olafur Gudmundsson for clarifying DNSSEC capabilities of small devices; Simon Kelley for its feedback as dnsmasq implementer; Andrew Sullivan, Mark Andrew, Ted Lemon, Mikael Abrahamson, and Ray Bellis for their feedback on handling different views as well as clarifying the impact of outsourcing the zone signing operation outside the HNA; Mark Andrew and Peter Koch for clarifying the renumbering. At last the authors would like to thank Kiran Makhijani for her in-depth review that contributed in shaping the final version.

The co-authors would like to thank Chris Griffiths and Wouter Cloetens that provided a significant contribution in the early versions of the document.

This document describes address allocation for private internets. This document specifies an Internet Best Current Practices for the Internet Community, and requests discussion and suggestions for improvements. In many standards track documents several words are used to signify the requirements in the specification. These words are often capitalized. This document defines these words as they should be interpreted in IETF documents. This document specifies an Internet Best Current Practices for the Internet Community, and requests discussion and suggestions for improvements. RFC 2119 specifies common key words that may be used in protocol specifications. This document aims to reduce the ambiguity by clarifying that only UPPERCASE usage of the key words have the defined special meanings. This document specifies the behavior that is expected from the Domain Name System with regard to DNS queries for names ending with '.home.arpa.' and designates this domain as a special-use domain name. 'home.arpa.' is designated for non-unique use in residential home networks. The Home Networking Control Protocol (HNCP) is updated to use the 'home.arpa.' domain instead of '.home'. This document describes the use of Transport Layer Security (TLS) to provide privacy for DNS. Encryption provided by TLS eliminates opportunities for eavesdropping and on-path tampering with DNS queries in the network, such as discussed in RFC 7626. In addition, this document specifies two usage profiles for DNS over TLS and provides advice on performance considerations to minimize overhead from using TCP and TLS with DNS.This document focuses on securing stub-to-recursive traffic, as per the charter of the DPRIVE Working Group. It does not prevent future applications of the protocol to recursive-to-authoritative traffic. This document describes a method to allow DNS Operators to more easily update DNSSEC Key Signing Keys using the DNS as a communication channel. The technique described is aimed at delegations in which it is currently hard to move information from the Child to Parent. This RFC is the revised basic definition of The Domain Name System. It obsoletes RFC-882. This memo describes the domain style names and their used for host address look up and electronic mail forwarding. It discusses the clients and servers in the domain name system and the protocol used between them. This document specifies version 1.3 of the Transport Layer Security (TLS) protocol. TLS allows client/server applications to communicate over the Internet in a way that is designed to prevent eavesdropping, tampering, and message forgery.This document updates RFCs 5705 and 6066, and obsoletes RFCs 5077, 5246, and 6961. This document also specifies new requirements for TLS 1.2 implementations. This memo describes the NOTIFY opcode for DNS, by which a master server advises a set of slave servers that the master's data has been changed and that a query should be initiated to discover the new data. [STANDARDS-TRACK] This document proposes extensions to the DNS protocols to provide an incremental zone transfer (IXFR) mechanism. [STANDARDS-TRACK] The standard means within the Domain Name System protocol for maintaining coherence among a zone's authoritative name servers consists of three mechanisms. Authoritative Transfer (AXFR) is one of the mechanisms and is defined in RFC 1034 and RFC 1035.The definition of AXFR has proven insufficient in detail, thereby forcing implementations intended to be compliant to make assumptions, impeding interoperability. Yet today we have a satisfactory set of implementations that do interoperate. This document is a new definition of AXFR -- new in the sense that it records an accurate definition of an interoperable AXFR mechanism. [STANDARDS-TRACK] DNS zone transfers are transmitted in cleartext, which gives attackers the opportunity to collect the content of a zone by eavesdropping on network connections. The DNS Transaction Signature (TSIG) mechanism is specified to restrict direct zone transfer to authorized clients only, but it does not add confidentiality. This document specifies the use of TLS, rather than cleartext, to prevent zone content collection via passive monitoring of zone transfers: XFR over TLS (XoT). Additionally, this specification updates RFC 1995 and RFC 5936 with respect to efficient use of TCP connections and RFC 7766 with respect to the recommended number of connections between a client and server for each transport. The Domain Name System Security (DNSSEC) Extensions introduced the NSEC resource record (RR) for authenticated denial of existence. This document introduces an alternative resource record, NSEC3, which similarly provides authenticated denial of existence. However, it also provides measures against zone enumeration and permits gradual expansion of delegation-centric zones. [STANDARDS-TRACK] This document is part of a family of documents that describe the DNS Security Extensions (DNSSEC). The DNS Security Extensions are a collection of resource records and protocol modifications that provide source authentication for the DNS. This document defines the public key (DNSKEY), delegation signer (DS), resource record digital signature (RRSIG), and authenticated denial of existence (NSEC) resource records. The purpose and format of each resource record is described in detail, and an example of each resource record is given. This document obsoletes RFC 2535 and incorporates changes from all updates to RFC 2535. [STANDARDS-TRACK] As networked devices become smaller, more portable, and more ubiquitous, the ability to operate with less configured infrastructure is increasingly important. In particular, the ability to look up DNS resource record data types (including, but not limited to, host names) in the absence of a conventional managed DNS server is useful.Multicast DNS (mDNS) provides the ability to perform DNS-like operations on the local link in the absence of any conventional Unicast DNS server. In addition, Multicast DNS designates a portion of the DNS namespace to be free for local use, without the need to pay any annual fee, and without the need to set up delegations or otherwise configure a conventional DNS server to answer for those names.The primary benefits of Multicast DNS names are that (i) they require little or no administration or configuration to set them up, (ii) they work when no infrastructure is present, and (iii) they work during infrastructure failures. This document describes the Dynamic Host Configuration Protocol for IPv6 (DHCPv6): an extensible mechanism for configuring nodes with network configuration parameters, IP addresses, and prefixes. Parameters can be provided statelessly, or in combination with stateful assignment of one or more IPv6 addresses and/or IPv6 prefixes. DHCPv6 can operate either in place of or in addition to stateless address autoconfiguration (SLAAC).This document updates the text from RFC 3315 (the original DHCPv6 specification) and incorporates prefix delegation (RFC 3633), stateless DHCPv6 (RFC 3736), an option to specify an upper bound for how long a client should wait before refreshing information (RFC 4242), a mechanism for throttling DHCPv6 clients when DHCPv6 service is not available (RFC 7083), and relay agent handling of unknown messages (RFC 7283). In addition, this document clarifies the interactions between models of operation (RFC 7550). As such, this document obsoletes RFC 3315, RFC 3633, RFC 3736, RFC 4242, RFC 7083, RFC 7283, and RFC 7550. The Port Control Protocol allows an IPv6 or IPv4 host to control how incoming IPv6 or IPv4 packets are translated and forwarded by a Network Address Translator (NAT) or simple firewall, and also allows a host to optimize its outgoing NAT keepalive messages. This document discusses a number of differences between the Intermediate System to Intermediate System (IS-IS) protocol used to route IP traffic as described in RFC 1195 and the protocol as it is deployed today. These differences are discussed as a service to those implementing, testing, and deploying the IS-IS Protocol to route IP traffic. A companion document describes the differences between the protocol described in ISO 10589 and current practice. This memo provides information for the Internet community. This document defines an IPv6 unicast address format that is globally unique and is intended for local communications, usually inside of a site. These addresses are not expected to be routable on the global Internet. [STANDARDS-TRACK] This specification defines the addressing architecture of the IP Version 6 (IPv6) protocol. The document includes the IPv6 addressing model, text representations of IPv6 addresses, definition of IPv6 unicast addresses, anycast addresses, and multicast addresses, and an IPv6 node's required addresses.This document obsoletes RFC 3513, "IP Version 6 Addressing Architecture". [STANDARDS-TRACK] In an IPv6 network, it is possible to use only link-local addresses on infrastructure links between routers. This document discusses the advantages and disadvantages of this approach to facilitate the decision process for a given network. To participate in wide-area IP networking, a host needs to be configured with IP addresses for its interfaces, either manually by the user or automatically from a source on the network such as a Dynamic Host Configuration Protocol (DHCP) server. Unfortunately, such address configuration information may not always be available. It is therefore beneficial for a host to be able to depend on a useful subset of IP networking functions even when no address configuration is available. This document describes how a host may automatically configure an interface with an IPv4 address within the 169.254/16 prefix that is valid for communication with other devices connected to the same physical (or logical) link.IPv4 Link-Local addresses are not suitable for communication with devices not directly connected to the same physical (or logical) link, and are only used where stable, routable addresses are not available (such as on ad hoc or isolated networks). This document does not recommend that IPv4 Link-Local addresses and routable addresses be configured simultaneously on the same interface. [STANDARDS-TRACK] This document proposes a method for performing secure Domain Name System (DNS) dynamic updates. [STANDARDS-TRACK] This text describes evolving networking technology within residential home networks with increasing numbers of devices and a trend towards increased internal routing. The goal of this document is to define a general architecture for IPv6-based home networking, describing the associated principles, considerations, and requirements. The text briefly highlights specific implications of the introduction of IPv6 for home networking, discusses the elements of the architecture, and suggests how standard IPv6 mechanisms and addressing can be employed in home networking. The architecture describes the need for specific protocol extensions for certain additional functionality. It is assumed that the IPv6 home network is not actively managed and runs as an IPv6-only or dual-stack network. There are no recommendations in this text for the IPv4 part of the network. Public Key Infrastructure using X.509 (PKIX) certificates are used for a number of purposes, the most significant of which is the authentication of domain names. Thus, certification authorities (CAs) in the Web PKI are trusted to verify that an applicant for a certificate legitimately represents the domain name(s) in the certificate. As of this writing, this verification is done through a collection of ad hoc mechanisms. This document describes a protocol that a CA and an applicant can use to automate the process of verification and certificate issuance. The protocol also provides facilities for other certificate management functions, such as certificate revocation. The Domain Name System (DNS) is defined in literally dozens of different RFCs. The terminology used by implementers and developers of DNS protocols, and by operators of DNS systems, has sometimes changed in the decades since the DNS was first defined. This document gives current definitions for many of the terms used in the DNS in a single document.This document obsoletes RFC 7719 and updates RFC 2308. This document describes the Home Networking Control Protocol (HNCP), an extensible configuration protocol, and a set of requirements for home network devices. HNCP is described as a profile of and extension to the Distributed Node Consensus Protocol (DNCP). HNCP enables discovery of network borders, automated configuration of addresses, name resolution, service discovery, and the use of any routing protocol that supports routing based on both the source and destination address. Ericsson ISOC The DNS Security Extensions (DNSSEC) define a process for validating received data and assert them authentic and complete as opposed to forged. This document clarifies the scope and responsibilities of DNSSEC Resolver Operators (DRO) as well as operational recommendations that DNSSEC validators operators SHOULD put in place in order to implement sufficient trust that makes DNSSEC validation output accurate. The recommendations described in this document include, provisioning mechanisms as well as monitoring and management mechanisms. This document identifies a set of recommendations for the makers of devices and describes how to provide for "simple security" capabilities at the perimeter of local-area IPv6 networks in Internet-enabled homes and small offices. This document is not an Internet Standards Track specification; it is published for informational purposes. DNS queries and responses are visible to network elements on the path between the DNS client and its server. These queries and responses can contain privacy-sensitive information, which is valuable to protect.This document proposes the use of Datagram Transport Layer Security (DTLS) for DNS, to protect against passive listeners and certain active attacks. As latency is critical for DNS, this proposal also discusses mechanisms to reduce DTLS round trips and reduce the DTLS handshake size. The proposed mechanism runs over port 853. This document defines a protocol for sending DNS queries and getting DNS responses over HTTPS. Each DNS query-response pair is mapped into an HTTP exchange. This document describes the use of QUIC to provide transport confidentiality for DNS. The encryption provided by QUIC has similar properties to those provided by TLS, while QUIC transport eliminates the head-of-line blocking issues inherent with TCP and provides more efficient packet-loss recovery than UDP. DNS over QUIC (DoQ) has privacy properties similar to DNS over TLS (DoT) specified in RFC 7858, and latency characteristics similar to classic DNS over UDP. This specification describes the use of DoQ as a general-purpose transport for DNS and includes the use of DoQ for stub to recursive, recursive to authoritative, and zone transfer scenarios. Using this specification of the UPDATE opcode, it is possible to add or delete RRs or RRsets from a specified zone. Prerequisites are specified separately from update operations, and can specify a dependency upon either the previous existence or nonexistence of an RRset, or the existence of a single RR. [STANDARDS-TRACK] Encrypted communication on the Internet often uses Transport Layer Security (TLS), which depends on third parties to certify the keys used. This document improves on that situation by enabling the administrators of domain names to specify the keys used in that domain's TLS servers. This requires matching improvements in TLS client software, but no change in TLS server software. [STANDARDS-TRACK] This document describes an updated version of the "Security Architecture for IP", which is designed to provide security services for traffic at the IP layer. This document obsoletes RFC 2401 (November 1998). [STANDARDS-TRACK] This document describes version 2 of the Internet Key Exchange (IKE) protocol. IKE is a component of IPsec used for performing mutual authentication and establishing and maintaining Security Associations (SAs). This document obsoletes RFC 5996, and includes all of the errata for it. It advances IKEv2 to be an Internet Standard. Misissued public-key certificates can prevent TLS clients from appropriately authenticating the TLS server. Several alternatives have been proposed to detect this situation and prevent a client from establishing a TLS session with a TLS end point authenticated with an illegitimate public-key certificate. These mechanisms are either not widely deployed or limited to public web browsing.This document proposes experimental extensions to TLS with opaque pinning tickets as a way to pin the server's identity. During an initial TLS session, the server provides an original encrypted pinning ticket. In subsequent TLS session establishment, upon receipt of the pinning ticket, the server proves its ability to decrypt the pinning ticket and thus the ownership of the pinning protection key. The client can now safely conclude that the TLS session is established with the same TLS server as the original TLS session. One of the important properties of this proposal is that no manual management actions are required. Ericsson Akamai Internet Systems Consortium, Inc. This document defines DHCPv6 options so an agnostic Homenet Naming Authority (HNA) can automatically proceed to the appropriate configuration and outsource the authoritative naming service for the home network. In most cases, the outsourcing mechanism is transparent for the end user. In IPv4, Internet Service Providers (ISPs) commonly provide IN-ADDR.ARPA information for their customers by prepopulating the zone with one PTR record for every available address. This practice does not scale in IPv6. This document analyzes different approaches and considerations for ISPs in managing the IP6.ARPA zone. This document describes a procedure that can be used to renumber a network from one prefix to another. It uses IPv6's intrinsic ability to assign multiple addresses to a network interface to provide continuity of network service through a "make-before-break" transition, as well as addresses naming and configuration management issues. It also uses other IPv6 features to minimize the effort and time required to complete the transition from the old prefix to the new prefix. This memo provides information for the Internet community. This document briefly introduces the existing mechanisms that could be utilized for IPv6 site renumbering and tries to cover most of the explicit issues and requirements associated with IPv6 renumbering. The content is mainly a gap analysis that provides a basis for future works to identify and develop solutions or to stimulate such development as appropriate. The gap analysis is organized by the main steps of a renumbering process. USC/ISI Bloomberg, L.P. NSEC3 is a DNSSEC mechanism providing proof of nonexistence by asserting that there are no names that exist between two domain names within a zone. Unlike its counterpart NSEC, NSEC3 avoids directly disclosing the bounding domain name pairs. This document provides guidance on setting NSEC3 parameters based on recent operational deployment experience. This document updates RFC 5155 with guidance about selecting NSEC3 iteration and salt parameters. IPv6 offers a much larger address space than that of its IPv4 counterpart. An IPv6 subnet of size /64 can (in theory) accommodate approximately 1.844 * 10^19 hosts, thus resulting in a much lower host density (#hosts/#addresses) than is typical in IPv4 networks, where a site typically has 65,000 or fewer unique addresses. As a result, it is widely assumed that it would take a tremendous effort to perform address-scanning attacks against IPv6 networks; therefore, IPv6 address-scanning attacks have been considered unfeasible. This document formally obsoletes RFC 5157, which first discussed this assumption, by providing further analysis on how traditional address-scanning techniques apply to IPv6 networks and exploring some additional techniques that can be employed for IPv6 network reconnaissance. This document specifies requirements for an IPv6 Customer Edge (CE) router. Specifically, the current version of this document focuses on the basic provisioning of an IPv6 CE router and the provisioning of IPv6 hosts attached to it. The document also covers IP transition technologies. Two transition technologies in RFC 5969's IPv6 Rapid Deployment on IPv4 Infrastructures (6rd) and RFC 6333's Dual-Stack Lite (DS-Lite) are covered in the document. The document obsoletes RFC 6204. This document describes an extension to IPv6 Stateless Address Autoconfiguration that causes hosts to generate temporary addresses with randomized interface identifiers for each prefix advertised with autoconfiguration enabled. Changing addresses over time limits the window of time during which eavesdroppers and other information collectors may trivially perform address-based network-activity correlation when the same address is employed for multiple transactions by the same host. Additionally, it reduces the window of exposure of a host as being accessible via an address that becomes revealed as a result of active communication. This document obsoletes RFC 4941. The OAuth 2.0 authorization framework enables a third-party application to obtain limited access to an HTTP service, either on behalf of a resource owner by orchestrating an approval interaction between the resource owner and the HTTP service, or by allowing the third-party application to obtain access on its own behalf. This specification replaces and obsoletes the OAuth 1.0 protocol described in RFC 5849. [STANDARDS-TRACK] This document proposes a notational convention to express Concise Binary Object Representation (CBOR) data structures (RFC 7049). Its main goal is to provide an easy and unambiguous way to express structures for protocol messages and data formats that use CBOR or JSON. Sandelman Software Works This document describes a method to provisioning an 802.1AR-style certificate into a router intended for use in the home. The proceedure results in a certificate which can be validated with a public trust anchor ("WebPKI"), using a name rather than an IP address. This method is focused on home routers, but can in some cases be used by other classes of IoT devices. (RFCEDITOR please remove: this document can be found at https://github.com/mcr/homerouter-provisioning)

This document does not deal with how the HNA is provisioned with a trusted relationship to the Distribution Manager for the forward zone. This section details what needs to be provisioned into the HNA and serves as a requirements statement for mechanisms. The HNA needs to be provisioned with: the Registered Domain (e.g., myhome.example ) the contact info for the Distribution Manager (DM), including the DNS name (FQDN), possibly including the IP literal, and a certificate (or anchor) to be used to authenticate the service the DM transport protocol and port (the default is DNS over TLS, on port 853) the HNA credentials used by the DM for its authentication. The HNA will need to select an IP address for communication for the Synchronization Channel. This is typically the WAN address of the CPE, but could be an IPv6 LAN address in the case of a home with multiple ISPs (and multiple border routers). This is detailed in when the NS and A or AAAA RRsets are communicated. The above parameters MUST be be provisioned for ISP-specific reverse zones, as per . ISP-specific forward zones MAY also be provisioned using , but zones which are not related to a specific ISP zone (such as with a DNS provider) must be provisioned through other means. Similarly, if the HNA is provided by a registrar, the HNA may be handed pre-configured to end user. In the absence of specific pre-established relation, these pieces of information may be entered manually by the end user. In order to ease the configuration from the end user the following scheme may be implemented. The HNA may present the end user a web interface where it provides the end user the ability to indicate the Registered Homenet Domain or the registrar for example a preselected list. Once the registrar has been selected, the HNA redirects the end user to that registrar in order to receive a access token. The access token will enable the HNA to retrieve the DM parameters associated to the Registered Domain. These parameters will include the credentials used by the HNA to establish the Control and Synchronization Channels. Such architecture limits the necessary steps to configure the HNA from the end user.

This section is non-normative and specifies an optional format for the set of parameters required by the HNA to configure the naming architecture of this document. In cases where a home router has not been provisioned by the manufacturer (when forward zones are provided by the manufacturer), or by the ISP (when the ISP provides this service), then a home user/owner will need to configure these settings via an administrative interface. By defining a standard format (in JSON) for this configuration information, the user/owner may be able to just copy and paste a configuration blob from the service provider into the administrative interface of the HNA. This format may also provide the basis for a future OAUTH2 flow that could do the setup automatically. The HNA needs to be configured with the following parameters as described by this CDDL . These are the parameters are necessary to establish a secure channel between the HNA and the DM as well as to specify the DNS zone that is in the scope of the communication.

For example:

The Domain Name of the zone. Multiple Registered Homenet Domains may be provided. This will generate the creation of multiple Public Homenet Zones. This parameter is MANDATORY. The associated FQDNs or IP addresses of the DM to which DNS notifies should be sent. This parameter is MANDATORY. IP addresses are optional and the FQDN is sufficient and preferred. If there are concerns about the security of the name to IP translation, then DNSSEC should be employed. As the session between the HNA and the DM is authenticated with TLS, the use of names is easier. As certificates are more commonly emitted for FQDN than for IP addresses, it is preferred to use names and authenticate the name of the DM during the TLS session establishment. The transport that carries the DNS exchanges between the HNA and the DM. Typical value is “DoT” but it may be extended in the future with “DoH”, “DoQ” for example. This parameter is OPTIONAL and by default the HNA uses DoT. Indicates the port used by the DM. This parameter is OPTIONAL and the default value is provided by the Supported Transport. In the future, additional transport may not have default port, in which case either a default port needs to be defined or this parameter become MANDATORY. Note that HNA does not defines ports for the Synchronization Channel. In any case, this is not expected to part of the configuration, but instead negotiated through the Configuration Channel. Currently the Configuration Channel does not provide this, and limits its agility to a dedicated IP address. If such agility is needed in the future, additional exchanges will need to be defined. How the HNA authenticates itself to the DM within the TLS connection(s). The authentication meth of can typically be “certificate”, “psk” or “none”. This Parameter is OPTIONAL and by default the Authentication Method is “certificate”. Authentication data (“hna_certificate”, “hna_key”): : The certificate chain used to authenticate the HNA. This parameter is OPTIONAL and when not specified, a self-signed certificate is used. The subnet from which the CPE should accept SOA queries and AXFR requests. A subnet is used in the case where the DOI consists of a number of different systems. An array of addresses is permitted. This parameter is OPTIONAL and if unspecified, the CPE uses the IP addresses provided by the dm parameter either directly when dm indicates an IP address or the IP addresses returned by the DNS(SEC) resolution when dm indicates a FQDN. For forward zones, the relationship between the HNA and the forward zone provider may be the result of a number of transactions: The forward zone outsourcing may be provided by the maker of the Homenet router. In this case, the identity and authorization could be built in the device at manufacturer provisioning time. The device would need to be provisioned with a device-unique credential, and it is likely that the Registered Homenet Domain would be derived from a public attribute of the device, such as a serial number (see or for more details ). The forward zone outsourcing may be provided by the Internet Service Provider. In this case, the use of to provide the credentials is appropriate. The forward zone may be outsourced to a third party, such as a domain registrar. In this case, the use of the JSON-serialized YANG data model described in this section is appropriate, as it can easily be copy and pasted by the user, or downloaded as part of a web transaction. For reverse zones, the relationship is always with the upstream ISP (although there may be more than one), and so is always the appropriate interface. The following is an abbridged example of a set of data that represents the needed configuration parameters for outsourcing.

This scenario is one where a homenet router device manufacturer decides to offer DNS hosting as a value add. describes a process for a home router credential provisioning system. The outline of it is that near the end of the manufacturing process, as part of the firmware loading, the manufacturer provisions a private key and certificate into the device. In addition to having a assymmetric credential known to the manufacturer, the device also has been provisioned with an agreed upon name. In the example in the above document, the name “n8d234f.r.example.net” has already been allocated and confirmed with the manufacturer. The HNA can use the above domain for itself. It is not very pretty or personal, but if the owner wishes a better name, they can arrange for it. The configuration would look like:

The dm_ctrl and dm_port values would be built into the firmware.